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I.  INTRODUCTION   
In EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., an employer, through its 
counsel, attempted to discuss and negotiate an employment discrimination 
claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“Commission”).1  Instead of responding to the employer, the Commission 
declared that efforts to conciliate were unsuccessful and filed suit against the 
employer in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.2  
This is just one instance where the Commission has demonstrated it does not 
always participate in good faith in the required conciliation process.3  A 
minimal review of conciliation efforts is necessary, and Congress should 
amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) to provide 
courts the power to sanction the Commission or an employer that does not 
engage in good faith in conciliation.   
The purpose of conciliation is for opposing parties to avoid the court 
system by encouraging out-of-court settlements.4  Employers in the majority 
of circuits can argue failure to conciliate as an affirmative defense when 
employers feel the Commission has failed its duty to conciliate.5  However, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently held that 
                                                                                                                           
* Blair Keltner is third-year law student expecting her J.D. from Southern Illinois University School 
of Law in May 2015.  She thanks Professor Cheryl Anderson for her helpful feedback on this 
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1. 340 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2003).   
2. Id. at 1258–59. 
3. See EEOC v. Agro Distrib., L.L.C., 555 F.3d 462 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that the Commission 
failed to participate in good faith conciliation when it did not respond to an employer’s requests for 
ten months).  
4. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d at 1260. 
5. See Agro Distrib., L.L.C., 555 F.3d 462; Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256; EEOC v. 
Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529 (2d Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 
302 (7th Cir. 1988); EEOC v. Keco Indus., 748 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Radiator 
Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1979); EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1978).  
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conciliation efforts are not judicially reviewable and as such cannot be raised 
as an affirmative defense.6  
This Comment will discuss the background and policy of conciliation, 
specifically, using failure to conciliate as an affirmative defense.  This 
Comment will discuss the three conciliation methods currently in use, 
followed by a discussion of what Title VII provides regarding judicial review 
of the Commission’s conciliation efforts.  This Comment will further discuss 
the precedent that exists for judicial review in labor disputes under the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).  Finally, this Comment will argue 
that a minimal review of conciliation efforts is necessary and suggest that a 
statutory amendment is needed to encourage both the Commission and an 
employer to participate in good faith in the conciliation process.   
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to give the Commission litigation 
authority.  The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 19727 authorizes the 
Commission to bring suit against employers who engage in unlawful 
discrimination practices.8  The Commission must follow specific procedural 
requirements to bring suit on behalf of an employee.9  After receiving a 
complaint of an alleged unlawful employment practice, the Commission 
must investigate the potential claim to determine its truthfulness.10  When 
there is reasonable cause that an unlawful employment practice occurred, the 
Commission must issue a letter of determination notifying the employer.11  
The Commission “shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful 
employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and 
                                                                                                                           
6. See EEOC v. Mach Mining, L.L.C., 738 F.3d 171 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2872 
(2014). 
7. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2013). 
8. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— (1) to fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his 
employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”). 
9. Id. (“[I]f within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission or within thirty days after 
expiration of any period . . . the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a 
conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil 
action . . . .”). 
10. Id. § 2000e-5(b). 
11. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21(a)-(b) (2013).  
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persuasion.”12  The duty to conciliate is a condition precedent to the 
Commission’s right to sue on behalf of an employee.13 
Through conciliation, the Commission “shall attempt” to achieve an 
equitable resolution of violations and secure an agreement that eliminates the 
alleged unlawful discrimination and provides relief for the employee.14  
Conciliation offers an employer the possibility of voluntary compliance prior 
to the filing of a formal claim by the Commission.15  “[N]othing that is said 
or done during and as part of the informal endeavors of the Commission to 
eliminate unlawful employment practices by informal methods . . . may be 
made a matter of public information . . . or used as evidence in a subsequent 
proceeding . . . .”16  The Commission must attempt conciliation prior to 
bringing suit against an employer.  Where conciliation attempts are 
successful, the terms of the agreement must be reduced to writing and signed 
by the parties and the Commission.17  However, when the Commission 
determines it cannot reach a conciliation agreement, it must notify the 
employer in writing.18  The Commission may file suit after it determines an 
impasse has been reached.19      
The legislative history of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act20 
shows that Congress believed the duty to conciliate was of the utmost 
importance.  Congress stated, “Only if conciliation proves to be impossible 
do we expect the Commission to bring an action in federal district court to 
seek enforcement.”21  Thus, the purpose of conciliation is to avoid the court 
system by encouraging out-of-court settlements.22  Conciliation enables the 
Commission and an employer to negotiate in an attempt to determine how 
the employer may alter its practices to comply with the law and establish any 
damages the employer may pay.23  As the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit observed, “Since the Act states that the Commission ‘shall’ 
endeavor to eliminate alleged unlawful employment practices by 
conciliation, and sue only if it is unable to secure a conciliation agreement, it 
has generally been held that a showing of some effort is a precondition of 
bringing suit.”24  The Supreme Court has also recognized the importance of 
                                                                                                                           
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). 
13. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). 
14. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24.  
15. Resolving a Charge, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/resolving.cfm (last visited Apr. 13, 
2015).  
16. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.26. 
17. Id. § 1601.24. 
18. Id. § 1601.25.  
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2013). 
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17. 
21. 118 CONG. REC. 7563 (1972). 
22. EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2003). 
23. EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1535 (2d Cir. 1996).  
24. EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527, 532 (10th Cir. 1978).  
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resolving employment discrimination claims by informal means.25  Congress 
determined voluntary compliance was the “preferred means for achieving the 
goal of equality of employment opportunities.”26 
However, the statutory provisions raise a question regarding the 
Commission’s obligations as a prerequisite to bringing suit.  Employers in 
the majority of circuits can argue failure to conciliate as an affirmative 
defense when employers feel the Commission has failed its duty to 
conciliate.27  Courts will review the Commission’s conciliation procedure, 
and in cases where the Commission has not met its duty to conciliate, courts 
have either dismissed the complaint28 or have infrequently awarded summary 
judgment for the defendant.29  However, the Seventh Circuit recently held 
that conciliation efforts are not judicially reviewable and as such cannot be 
raised as an affirmative defense.30   
 A.  Survey of Court Cases  
As a result of the Seventh Circuit’s decision, there are now three 
different stances taken by the federal circuits regarding conciliation.31  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits 
engage in a minimal level of review to determine whether conciliation was 
attempted in good faith.32  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits employ a more exacting three-part 
inquiry to determine whether conciliation was in good faith.33  The Seventh 
Circuit will no longer review the Commission’s conciliation efforts.34   
 
 
                                                                                                                           
25. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 368 (1977) (“[T]he EEOC does not 
function simply as a vehicle for conducting litigation on behalf of private parties; it is a federal 
administrative agency charged with the responsibility of investigating claims of employment 
discrimination and settling disputes, if possible, in an informal, noncoercive fashion.”) (emphasis 
added).   
26. Id. at 367–68 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974)). 
27. See EEOC v. Agro Distrib., L.L.C., 555 F.3d 462 (5th Cir. 2009); Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 
F.3d 1256; Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529; EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302 
(7th Cir. 1988); EEOC v. Keco Indus., 748 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Radiator Specialty 
Co., 610 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1979); Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527.   
28. See Sears, Roebuck & Co., 650 F.2d at 19; EEOC v. Magnolia Elec. Power Assn., 635 F.2d 375, 
378–79 (5th Cir. 1981). 
29. See EEOC v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 476 F. Supp. 341 (Mass. D. 1979). 
30. See EEOC v. Mach Mining, L.L.C., 738 F.3d 171 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2872 
(2014). 
31. See id.; Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256; Keco Indus., 748 F.2d 1097. 
32. See Keco Indus., 748 F.2d 1097; Radiator Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178; Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527. 
33. See EEOC v. Agro Distrib., L.L.C., 555 F.3d 462 (5th Cir. 2009); Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 
F.3d 1256; EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529 (2d Cir. 1996).  
34. See Mach Mining, 738 F.2d 171.  
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1.  Minimal Review for Good Faith  
The Sixth Circuit requires the Commission engage in a good faith effort 
to conciliate and will allow judicial review to determine if this standard was 
met.  In EEOC v. Keco Industries, Inc., the Sixth Circuit reviewed the 
Commission’s efforts and held that a good faith effort requires only an 
attempt at conciliation.35  The form and substance of conciliation is within 
the discretion of the Commission and is beyond judicial review.36  Therefore, 
a court’s subjective beliefs regarding the content of the Commission’s 
conciliation agreement should not be considered, and only an attempt to 
conciliate matters.37 
In Keco Industries, the Commission found reasonable cause that the 
employer discriminated against female employees.38  The Commission 
offered a settlement that addressed its findings of sex discrimination.39  When 
the employer rejected the proposed conciliation agreement, the Commission 
filed a discrimination claim against the employer.40  The court rejected the 
employer’s failure to conciliate defense and found the Commission made a 
good faith effort by attempting to conciliate the claim.41  The court held that 
the Commission must only make a good faith effort to conciliate, and once 
the employer rejects the offer, the Commission may file a lawsuit.42  The 
court criticized the district court’s review of the Commission’s conciliation 
efforts, finding that “an apparent dissatisfaction with the [Commission’s] 
conciliation attempt” is not the correct standard of review.43 
The Fourth and Tenth Circuits used the same minimal level of review 
to examine whether the Commission made a good faith effort in 
conciliation.44  In EEOC v. Radiator Specialty Co., the Commission filed an 
employment discrimination claim in district court after the defendant 
expressed that a meeting regarding a settlement would be futile.45  The Fourth 
Circuit emphasized that conciliation is required and is one of the 
Commission’s most essential functions.46  Here, the court found the 
Commission made a good faith attempt at conciliation by informing the 
employer that there was a reasonable cause determination and attempting to 
                                                                                                                           
35. Keco Indus., 748 F.2d at 1102. 
36. Id.  
37. Id.  
38. Id. at 1098. 
39. Id. at 1101.  
40. Id. at 1098. 
41. Id. at 1101–02. 
42. Id. at 1102.  
43. Id. 
44. See EEOC v. Radiator Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1979); EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527 
(10th Cir. 1978).  
45. Radiator Specialty Co., 610 F.2d at 183. 
46. Id.  
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resolve the claim through conciliation.47  The employer’s refusal to engage 
in conciliation was of no fault by the Commission, and therefore, the 
Commission was not precluded from bringing suit.48 
In EEOC v. Zia Co., the Tenth Circuit established that, because the 
Commission must attempt conciliation before it can bring suit, a good faith 
effort is required.49  The court stated that, “The inquiry into the duty of ‘good 
faith’ on the part of the [Commission] is relevant to whether the court should 
entertain the claim, or stay the proceedings for further conciliation 
efforts . . . .”50  As the Tenth Circuit viewed it, judicial review for a good 
faith effort does not require a court to examine the specifics of the 
proceedings between the Commission and the employer; however, nor does 
judicial review allow courts to impose their own beliefs regarding the content 
of a conciliation agreement.51  The court held that the Commission engaged 
in good faith efforts in the conciliation process by participating in various 
negotiations with the defendants.52 
This approach of judicial review is deferential to the Commission’s 
decisions while also making sure the Commission meets its obligation to 
conciliate.  Following a failed attempt at voluntary compliance through 
conciliation, the Commission may pursue litigation.  The Second, Fifth, and 
Eleventh Circuits agree that judicial review of the Commission’s conciliation 
efforts is necessary, but these circuits use a more stringent test than minimal 
review.    
2.  Three-Part Inquiry 
In EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., an employer raised the 
Commission’s failure to conciliate as an affirmative defense in an attempt to 
have the lawsuit dismissed.53  The Eleventh Circuit applied a three-part test 
to determine whether the Commission engaged in conciliation and whether 
the case should be dismissed.54  To satisfy its conciliation obligation, the 
Eleventh Circuit determined the Commission must: “(1) outline to the 
employer the reasonable cause for belief that Title VII has been violated; 
(2) offer an opportunity for voluntary compliance; and (3) respond in a 
reasonable and flexible manner to the reasonable attitudes of the employer.”55   
                                                                                                                           
47. Id.  
48. Id.  
49. 582 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1978). 
50. Id.  
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. 340 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2003).  
54. Id. at 1259. 
55. Id. (citing EEOC v. Klingler Elec. Corp., 636 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. 1981)).  
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In Asplundh, the Commission found reasonable cause to believe 
charges of harassment and retaliation were true and issued a Letter of 
Determination to the employer on March 31, 1999.56  On April 7, 1999, the 
Commission sent a proposed conciliation agreement that included a 
nationwide provision requiring the employer to notify all employees of the 
alleged discrimination.57  The agreement gave the employer twelve days to 
accept or respond.58  Upon receipt of the proposed agreement, the employer 
hired local counsel to investigate the potential liability.59  Local counsel 
requested a phone call with an investigator to discuss the case and the 
Commission’s determination; however, the Commission never responded 
and sent a letter the following day declaring that efforts to conciliate were 
unsuccessful.60  The district court held that the Commission failed its duty to 
conciliate and dismissed the case with sanctions.61 
Using the three-part criteria, the court determined that the Commission 
did not act in good faith and instead used an “all or nothing approach” that 
was intolerable.62  The conciliation proposal did not include a theory of 
liability, nor was the agreement proposed even possible.63  The court 
concluded that the Commission must use “nothing less than a reasonable 
effort to resolve with the employer the issues raised by the complainant . . .” 
and when the Commission does not clearly state the charges against the 
employer, there has not been “meaningful conciliation.”64  Due to the 
Commission’s failure to conciliate, the appellate court affirmed the case’s 
dismissal and the sanction of attorney’s fees.65   
The Second and Fifth Circuits also used the same three-step approach 
to determine whether conciliation was in good faith.66  In EEOC v. Argo 
Distribution, L.L.C., the Fifth Circuit determined that the Commission did 
not participate in good faith conciliation because it continuously failed to 
communicate with the employer and did not respond in a reasonable and 
flexible manner to the employer’s position.67  In that case, the employer 
requested clarification regarding the Commission’s policy and offered a 
                                                                                                                           
56. Id. at 1258. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 1259. 
62. Id. at 1260. 
63. Id.  The Commission’s proposed conciliation agreement sought reinstatement for the employee and 
front pay, which was impossible because the employment project at issue ended three years prior 
to the suit.  Id. at 1258.  
64. Id. at 1260. 
65. Id. at 1261. 
66. See EEOC v. Agro Distrib. L.L.C., 555 F.3d 462 (5th Cir. 2009); EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 
91 F.3d 1529 (2d Cir. 1996). 
67. Agro Distrib., 555 F.3d at 468. 
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settlement, but the Commission failed to respond for ten months.68  Applying 
the three-part test, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Commission violated 
its role as a neutral investigator by failing to participate in good faith 
conciliation and respond to the employer in a reasonable and flexible 
manner.69  Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit explained that conciliation is not a 
jurisdictional prerequisite but rather a precondition to a suit.70  Thus, courts 
may impose a stay to encourage the Commission to continue conciliation 
efforts prior to filing suit, or the case may be dismissed if it seems the 
appropriate remedy.71 
Similarly, the Second Circuit used the three-part inquiry to examine the 
Commission’s conciliation efforts in EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc.72  In 
Johnson & Higgins, however, the court determined good faith conciliation 
was met because the Commission outlined the reasonable cause of the 
employer’s discrimination and attempted to engage in an out-of-court 
settlement.73  
The circuits that employ the three-part inquiry of judicial review take a 
stringent look at the Commission’s conciliation efforts by examining both 
the form and substance of conciliation.  The circuits that employ a minimal 
review are deferential to the Commission’s decisions and do not examine the 
substance of conciliation agreements.  The Seventh Circuit now opposes 
judicial review of conciliation agreements altogether.74  
3.  Conciliation Efforts Are Not Reviewable 
The Seventh Circuit “ha[d] not specifically addressed the standard to 
be used by district courts facing allegations of deficient conciliation,”75 prior 
to its decision in EEOC v. Mach Mining, L.L.C.76  However, that court had 
previously found, in EEOC v. Elgin Teachers Ass’n, that the Commission 
had a right to bring a claim against an employer because it failed to get what 
it asked for in its bargaining agreement.77  The court acknowledged that the 
                                                                                                                           
68. Id. at 467.  
69. Id. at 468.  See also EEOC v. Klingler Elec. Corp., 636 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. 1981) (“In evaluating 
whether the EEOC has adequately fulfilled this statutory requirement, the fundamental question is 
the reasonableness and responsiveness of the EEOC's conduct under all the circumstances.”). 
70. Agro Distrib., 555 F.3d at 469. 
71. Id.  
72. 91 F.3d 1529, 1534 (2d Cir. 1996) (explaining that although the Commission brought this claim 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the court’s discussion regarding conciliation 
efforts is relevant to the discussion of the conciliation requirements under the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act).  
73. Id. at 1535.  
74. EEOC v. Mach Mining, L.L.C., 738 F.3d 171 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2872 (2014).  
75. EEOC v. United Rd. Towing, Inc., No. 10C6259, 2012 WL 1830099, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2012).  
76. Mach Mining, 738 F.3d 171.  
77. 27 F.3d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1994). 
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Commission must pursue conciliation.78  Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit 
evaluated the sufficiency of the Commission’s “statutorily mandated pre suit 
conciliation” efforts generally in EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.79  In Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., the court held that the Commission abused its conciliation 
requirements, among other things, prior to filing suit by refusing to discuss 
any of their claims against the employer and by making large monetary 
demands strictly to satisfy outside interest groups.80 
However, in EEOC v. Mach Mining L.L.C., the Seventh Circuit 
reversed its view and held that the failure to conciliate is not an affirmative 
defense to a discrimination suit.81  The court stated, “If the [Commission] has 
pled on the face of its complaint that it has complied with all procedures 
required under Title VII and the relevant documents are facially sufficient 
[the court’s] review of those procedures is satisfied.”82  In reaching this 
decision, the court evaluated the statutory language, whether there is a 
workable standard for such a defense, whether the defense might fit into the 
broader statutory scheme, and other relevant case law to determine that no 
affirmative defense exists for failure to conciliate.83   
The court reasoned that there is no express provision in the text of Title 
VII to warrant an affirmative defense based on the Commission’s failure to 
conciliate.84  The statute gives the Commission deference regarding the 
methods of conciliation and whether a conciliation agreement is acceptable.85  
The court believed an affirmative defense did not make sense in light of the 
Commission’s sole power to decide whether to accept an agreement.86  
Furthermore, an affirmative defense for failure to conciliate would conflict 
with the confidentiality provision87 required for the conciliation process.88  
“[Because] Title VII contains no exception allowing such information to be 
admitted for a collateral purpose, such as to satisfy a court that the EEOC’s 
efforts to conciliate were sufficient,” courts would have to decide whether 
conciliation was performed correctly without having evidence to review.89   
                                                                                                                           
78. Id. 
79. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). 
80. Id. at 358.  
81. Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 172. 
82. Id. at 184. 
83. Id. at 174. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2013) (“Nothing said or done during and as part of such informal 
endeavors may be made public by the Commission, its officers or employees, or used as evidence 
in a subsequent proceeding without the written consent of the persons concerned.  Any person who 
makes public information in violation of this subsection shall be fined not more than $1,000 or 
imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.”). 
88. Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 175. 
89. Id. 
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The Seventh Circuit further noted that an affirmative defense 
undermines conciliation by allowing employers to attack the Commission’s 
procedures instead of using the process to resolve a dispute.90  Specifically, 
the court was concerned that no bright line rule existed for how many offers 
or conferences would satisfy the Commission’s duty to conciliate and avoid 
judicial review.91  The Seventh Circuit explained, “Simply put, the 
conciliation defense tempts employers to turn what was meant to be an 
informal negotiation into the subject of endless disputes over whether the 
EEOC did enough before going to court.”92    
The court did not believe the Commission would engage in bad faith 
conciliation because it processes and investigates approximately 100,000 
charges of discrimination per year but only files suit in several hundred 
cases.93  The court reasoned that judicial review of conciliation is 
unnecessary because a trial on the merits protects employers from any bad 
faith attempts at conciliation the Commission may make.94  Furthermore, the 
Commission and an employer can continue settlement talks after litigation 
has been filed, so there is no reason to review conciliation attempts.95   
Finally, the court did not feel the remedies provided by judicial review 
of conciliation encouraged voluntary compliance by employers.96  Dismissal 
on the merits hinders conciliation efforts because an employer will not 
resume conciliation efforts following a dismissal.97  In this way, employers 
who have participated in actual employment discrimination may avoid 
liability based on a procedural technicality.98  Furthermore, the statute does 
not explicitly mention judicial review of conciliation, and dismissal on the 
merits for the Commission’s failure to conciliate could serve to excuse an 
employer’s unlawful discrimination.99  Thus, the Seventh Circuit will not 
review conciliation attempts where the Commission has pled on the face of 
its complaint that it has complied with all procedures required under Title 
VII and all the relevant documents are facially sufficient.100 
                                                                                                                           
90. Id. at 178. 
91. Id. at 175. 
92. Id. at 178–79. 
93. Id. at 180 (citing All Statutes FY 1997-2013, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ 
statistics/enforcement/all.cfm (last visited Apr. 13, 2015)).  In 2012, the Commission engaged in 
conciliation in 4207 cases, was unsuccessful in 2616 cases, but filed suit in only 122 cases. Id. 
(citing All Statutes FY 1997-2013, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/all.cfm 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2015)). 
94. Id. at 181. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 183. 
97. Id. at 183–84. 
98. Id. at 184. 
99. Id. at 183–84. 
100. Id. 
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The court criticized other circuits’ approaches to judicial review of the 
Commission’s conciliation efforts.  The court felt it was unnecessary to hold 
the Commission to a requirement of good faith101 in the conciliation process 
because of its informal and confidential nature, and also, the statute does not 
explicitly require good faith.102  The court specifically criticized the three-
step requirement103 as open-ended and requiring courts to make unnecessary 
assessments into the fairness and reasonableness of the Commission’s 
decisions, which is not mandated by the statute.104  The court reasoned that 
departure from these methods of judicial review made sense, because each 
method conflicts with the Commission’s discretion to accept or reject a 
conciliation agreement as well as the confidentiality provision of the 
statute.105   
By rejecting judicial review of the Commission’s conciliation efforts, 
the Seventh Circuit shows complete trust in the Commission to engage in the 
appropriate method of conciliation.  However, the majority of circuits believe 
that judicial review of conciliation efforts is necessary to ensure good faith 
attempts.  Judicial review of agency bargaining procedures is also common 
in the realm of labor law.   
B.  There is Precedent for Judicial Review in Labor and Employment Law 
Cases  
Although Title VII does not explicitly allow for judicial review of the 
Commission's conciliation efforts, it also does not speak against it.106  
Judicial review of agency bargaining procedures is common in the realm of 
labor and employment law.  For example, the NLRA107 provides for 
employers and unions to engage in good faith collective bargaining to resolve 
labor disputes.108  An employer engages in an unfair labor practice by 
“refus[ing] to bargain collectively with the representatives of his 
employees.”109  Unions have an identical obligation towards employers.110   
The NLRA grants the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) the 
power to review collective bargaining procedures, if necessary, to make 
certain that an unfair labor practice, such as a failure to participate in good 
                                                                                                                           
101. See EEOC v. Keco Indus. Inc., 748 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir. 1984). 
102. Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 183. 
103. See EEOC v. Agro Distrib. L.L.C., 555 F.3d 462 (5th Cir. 2009). 
104. Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 183. 
105. Id. 
106. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2013).  
107. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-161 (2013).  The NLRA was enacted to “eliminate 
the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and 
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred . . . .” Id. § 151. 
108. Id. §§ 157, 158(d).  
109. Id. § 158(a)(5). 
110. Id. § 158(b)(3). 
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faith in a collective bargaining agreement, does not occur.111  The NLRB may 
appoint another agent such as an administrative law judge to preside over a 
hearing to determine whether an unfair labor practice was committed.112  The 
NLRB may review an opinion and, upon a finding that an unfair labor 
practice was committed, the NLRB “shall state its findings of fact and shall 
issue . . . an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair 
labor practice, and to take such affirmative action . . . .”113 
To enforce the duty of collective bargaining, both the administrative 
law judges and the NLRB have authority similar to federal courts to impose 
sanctions for parties not complying with the statutory provisions in place.114  
Most often, the NLRB will issue a bargaining order accompanied by a cease 
and desist order to force an employer or union to engage in good faith 
collective bargaining.115  However, in a 1995 decision, the NLRB stated, 
“[Where] a respondent's substantial unfair labor practices have infected the 
core of a bargaining process to such an extent that their effects cannot be 
eliminated by the application of traditional remedies, an order requiring the 
respondent to reimburse the charging party for negotiation expenses is 
warranted . . . .”116   
For example, in 2011, a healthcare union alleged that a nursing home 
employer engaged in an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain 
collectively and in good faith.117  The NLRB affirmed the decision of the 
administrative law judge and held that the employer had engaged in unfair 
labor practices by reneging from tentative agreements, forcing the union to 
renegotiate multiple times, refusing to provide information to the union, and 
refusing to accept documents from the union.118  Based on this “aggravated 
misconduct” the court ordered the employer to reimburse the union and its 
general counsel for “their costs and expenses incurred in the investigation, 
preparation, and litigation of the cases” before an administrative law judge 
and the board.”119  The collective bargaining approach taken by the NLRA 
and enforced by the NLRB provides a model for judicial review of 
                                                                                                                           
111. See id. § 160(a). See also Employer/Union Rights and Obligations, NLRB, 
http://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/employerunion-rights-and-obligations (last visited Apr. 13, 
2015) (explaining good faith is assessed by examining the “history of negotiations and 
understandings of both parties” to determine whether a true impasse has been reached). 
112. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b).  
113. Id. § 160(c). 
114. See Camelot Terrace, 357 N.L.R.B. 161 (2011) (“Indeed, in light of the Act’s express grant of power 
to the Board to conduct trials, it cannot be gainsaid that the authority to preserve the integrity of 
those trials is ‘necessarily implied’ in the grant.”). 
115. Unbelievable, Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 857, 859 (1995). 
116. Id. at 859. 
117. Camelot Terrace, 357 N.L.R.B. 161. 
118. Id. 
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conciliation proceedings.  The statutory authority granted to the NLRB by 
which it reviews bargaining agreements for good faith would work well for 
courts evaluating conciliation procedures. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Judicial review of conciliation is necessary.  The Commission has a 
duty to conciliate, which is required by Title VII and emphasized in the 
legislative history.  The Seventh Circuit’s decision rejecting failure to 
conciliate as an affirmative defense was incorrect.  The minimal review 
approach is the proper standard of judicial review to ensure that the 
Commission engaged in good faith efforts of conciliation.  The approach 
used by the NLRB should serve as a model for judicial review of conciliation.  
Furthermore, Congress should amend Title VII to provide courts the power 
to sanction the Commission or an employer that does not engage in a good 
faith conciliation process.  
A.  The Seventh Circuit’s Decision Is Inconsistent with the Purpose of 
Conciliation  
The Seventh Circuit’s recent decision does not make sense in light of 
the legislative history and the majority of jurisdictions’ determinations that 
the statute requires conciliation.  The Seventh Circuit stated that judicial 
review of conciliation is unnecessary because the Commission has deference 
to accept or reject a conciliation agreement;120 however, this argument gives 
too much deference to the Commission and does not encourage voluntary 
compliance through out-of-court settlements.  Without the availability of an 
affirmative defense for failure to conciliate, there is no way to ensure the 
Commission engages in good faith conciliation.  If the Commission can 
bypass the conciliation requirement without any retribution from the judicial 
branch, the duty to conciliate becomes almost unenforceable.   
Judicial review is one of the fundamental aspects of our legal system,121 
and it does not make sense to hold that judicial review does not exist in this 
instance.  Judicial review is necessary to ensure Congress’ goal is realized 
that employers voluntarily comply with Title VII through out-of-court 
settlements.  The legislative history of Title VII is clear about the requirement 
of conciliation as stated in a 1972 Conference Committee Report, “The 
conferees contemplate that the Commission will continue to make every 
effort to conciliate as is required by existing law.  Only if conciliation proves 
                                                                                                                           
120. EEOC v. Mach Mining, L.L.C., 738 F.3d 171, 174 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2872 
(2014).  
121. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (holding legislative and executive actions are 
judicially reviewable by the Supreme Court).  
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to be impossible do we expect the Commission to bring an action in federal 
district court to seek enforcement.”122  Thus, it was Congress’ intent that the 
Commission engage in good faith conciliation and ensure compliance with 
Title VII by reaching out-of-court settlements with an employer.  Some 
courts have criticized the Commission for using a “shoot first, aim later” 
technique.123 Judicial review of conciliation efforts will prevent the 
Commission from engaging in unauthentic conciliation procedures and filing 
hasty claims against employers without providing the opportunity for 
voluntary compliance.124 Judicial review provides a check on the 
Commission’s behavior and ensures that there is dedication to obtaining out 
of court settlements.   
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit’s argument that judicial review of 
conciliation should not exist because it conflicts with the confidentiality 
provision is unsound.  The confidentiality provision states “Nothing said or 
done during and as part of [the conciliation process] may be made public by 
the Commission, its officers or employees, or used as evidence in a 
subsequent proceeding without the written consent of the persons 
concerned.”125  The Seventh Circuit argued that judicial review of 
conciliation forces courts to determine the sufficiency of conciliation efforts 
without having evidence to review.126   
The “subsequent proceeding” language is similar to Rule 408 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, which prohibits using compromise offers and 
negotiations to “prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed 
claim,” but allows the evidence to prove “a witness’s bias or prejudice, 
negating a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a 
criminal investigation or prosecution.”127  Similarly, the confidentiality 
provision seems to mean that anything said in a conciliation procedure cannot 
be used to prove or disprove a party’s fault, not that it prohibits a court from 
reviewing whether conciliation procedures conformed with the requirements.  
Like Rule 408, the confidentiality provision should only prohibit revealing 
the content of negotiations when the dispute is taken to trial to determine 
                                                                                                                           
122. 118 CONG. REC. 7563 (1972). 
123. See EEOC v. Peoplemark, Inc., 732 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2013) (awarding attorneys fees to the 
employer when the Commission pursued a claim that was unreasonable as it was based on a 
nonexistent companywide policy and the Commission continued to pursue the claim after knowing 
the alleged policy did not exist). 
124. See, e.g., Elizabeth Dunn, No Longer a Paper Tiger: The EEOC and Its Statutory Duty to 
Conciliate, 63 EMORY L.J. 455, 458 (2013) (“[A]s the agency increases the number of systemic 
discrimination cases it chooses to litigate, the potential for the agency to abuse its statutory duty to 
conciliate increases.”). 
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2013).  
126. EEOC v. Mach Mining, L.L.C., 738 F.3d 171, 175 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2872 
(2014). 
127. FED. R. EVID. 408. 
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whether the employer actually engaged in the alleged employment 
discrimination.  Furthermore, confidential information is regularly reviewed 
by courts without a problem, and court records can be sealed and kept 
confidential.128  Thus, judicial review of the Commission’s conciliation 
efforts should not fail simply because the information to be reviewed is 
confidential to the public.   
The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning for rejecting the approaches taken by 
other circuits is insufficient.  The court argued that minimal review of the 
Commission’s conciliation efforts was unnecessary because good faith 
conciliation is not required by the statute.129  However, it is common to imply 
a good faith requirement in both contracts and negotiations.130  Furthermore, 
in the labor law context, the NLRA requires an employer and union to act in 
good faith when engaging in collective bargaining.131  It does not make sense 
for Title VII to require conciliation as a prerequisite to filing suit, but not 
require parties to act in good faith.  If parties were not required to act in good 
faith, Congress’ goal of achieving voluntary compliance through out of court 
statements would never be met.   
Finally, the Seventh Circuit’s argument that there is no express 
provision regarding judicial review of conciliation efforts in Title VII is not 
persuasive because there is no provision rejecting judicial review of 
conciliation.132  The majority of circuits’ policy of allowing judicial review 
to determine whether the Commission engaged in its duty to conciliate 
should not be eliminated simply because it is not expressly stated in the 
statute.  
It seems the main reason why the Seventh Circuit no longer allows 
judicial review of the Commission’s conciliation efforts is because, the court 
argued, it provides a way for employers to get off the hook though a 
procedural technicality.133  However, the statute allows for judges to stay 
proceedings for further conciliation efforts.134  This provision provides a 
method by which a court can order the parties to reopen conciliation 
procedures.  This provision implies that some level of judicial involvement 
is expected in the conciliation process because without insight into the 
                                                                                                                           
128. See, e.g., ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, SEALING COURT RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS: A POCKET 
GUIDE 1 (2010) (“Courts will keep confidential classified information, ongoing investigations, trade 
secrets, and the identities of minors, for example.”).  
129. Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 183. 
130. See U.C.C. § 1-304 (2001) (“Every contract or duty within the Uniform Commercial Code imposes 
an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement.”). 
131. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2013). 
132. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2013).  
133. Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 184.  
134. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (“Upon request, the court may, in its discretion, stay further proceedings 
for not more than sixty days pending the termination of State or local proceedings described in 
subsections (c) or (d) of this section or further efforts of the Commission to obtain voluntary 
compliance.”).  
530 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 39 
 
conciliation proceedings, a court would not know when to grant a stay in 
proceedings.   
B.  A Minimal Review for a Good Faith Attempt at Conciliation Is the Best 
Method of Judicial Review  
A minimal review of the Commission’s conciliation efforts is the proper 
standard because it balances the equities of each approach by both 
encouraging the Commission to resolve conflicts with employers out-of-
court and by preventing an employer from getting off the hook due to a 
procedural technicality.  
First, minimal review of the Commission’s conciliation efforts is the 
proper standard because it encourages the Commission to resolve claims 
against employers through out-of-court settlements.  The circuits employing 
a more exacting review seem concerned that the Commission may engage in 
bad faith conciliation efforts and simply avoid participating in out-of-court 
settlements.135  However, minimal review of the Commission’s conciliation 
efforts encourages out-of-court settlements by allowing the Commission to 
use its expertise in determining whether an agreement is acceptable.  The 
Commission does not have to be concerned that judges will impose their own 
beliefs regarding the content of a conciliation agreement.  However, the 
requirement of good faith provides guidance to the Commission and 
employers of the appropriate level of effort needed when attempting 
voluntary compliance with Title VII through conciliation.   
The three-part method is not the proper standard of judicial review 
because it restricts the power granted to the Commission in Title VII.  
Specifically, the statute states, “[If] the Commission has been unable to 
secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the 
Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action against any 
respondent . . . .”136  The use of the terms “acceptable to the Commission” 
suggests that Congress intended to grant the Commission with the power to 
determine whether it has truly reached an impasse with an employer, which 
may only be resolved through litigation.  As stated by the Sixth Circuit, “[t]he 
form and substance of those conciliations is within the discretion of the 
EEOC as the agency created to administer and enforce our employment 
discrimination laws and is beyond judicial review.”137  Therefore, minimal 
review is appropriate because the Commission has the power to determine 
                                                                                                                           
135. See, e.g., EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
the Commission failed its duty to conciliate by using an “all or nothing approach” and “nothing less 
than a ‘reasonable’ effort to resolve with the employer the issues raised by the complainant” is 
required to engage in good faith conciliation).  
136. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).  
137. EEOC v. Keco Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 1097, 1102 (6th Cir. 1984).  
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the form and substance of a conciliation agreement, but judicial review is 
allowed to ensure that good faith was used in the Commission’s conciliation 
attempts.   
This grant of power to accept or reject an agreement should be 
supported by the Supreme Court, which has taken a plain meaning approach 
when evaluating the meaning of statutes.138  This approach requires that 
“unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, 
contemporary, common meaning.”139  The plain language of Title VII shows 
deference to the Commission through the use of the phrase “acceptable to the 
Commission.”140  A minimal level of judicial review aligns perfectly with the 
deference granted to the Commission because it leaves the form and 
substance of conciliation to the discretion of the Commission and looks only 
at whether there was a good faith attempt to conciliate matters.141  Although 
this minimal review provides a check on the Commission’s conciliation 
efforts, a court may not insert its own views regarding the terms of the 
conciliation agreement and must only determine whether the Commission 
engaged in a good faith effort to conciliate.142  This level of deference is not 
found in the three-step approach, which takes a less trusting and harsher view 
towards the Commission’s efforts by examining the content and process of 
conciliation.143  Congress clearly did not intend for the judiciary to distrust 
the Commission when it expressly granted authority. 
Further, minimal review of the Commission’s conciliation efforts will 
prevent an employer from getting off the hook due to a procedural 
technicality.  Because a minimal review does not allow courts to find the 
Commission engaged in bad faith conciliation when a judge personally 
disagrees with a conciliation offer, employers will no longer be able to use 
this defense when it believes the Commission offered them a demanding 
deal.  An employer will be encouraged to attempt voluntary compliance with 
the Commission rather than waste time and resources challenging the content 
of a conciliation offer.  In this way, both the employer and the Commission 
will be encouraged to act in good faith.   
                                                                                                                           
138. See, e.g., Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870 (2014) (using the plain meaning approach to 
define the term “clothes” in a statute).  See generally Robert J. Gregory, Overcoming Text in an Age 
of Textualism: A Practitioner’s Guide to Arguing Cases of Statutory Interpretation, 35 AKRON L. 
REV. 451, 453 (2002) (“Arguments rooted in non-textual considerations, if not totally eviscerated, 
are not held in favor by the courts.”).   
139. Sandifer, 134 S. Ct. at 877 (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).  
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).  
141. Keco Indus., 748 F.2d at 1102.   
142. See id. at 1102.  
143. See, e.g., EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2003) (deciding whether 
the Commission engaged in good faith conciliation, the court looked at the content of the proposed 
conciliation agreement).  
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The Seventh Circuit argued that the remedies available for failure to 
conciliate do not encourage employers’ voluntary compliance.144  To address 
these concerns, the statute should be amended to provide courts with the 
power to impose sanctions against both the Commission or an employer 
when either fails to participate in a good faith effort of conciliation.  
Amending the statute will provide the courts with the requisite power to 
enforce the conciliation requirement, ensuring that both the Commission and 
employers engage in good faith efforts to resolve disputes out of court.    
C.  Proposal: Congress Should Allow Courts to Sanction a Party that Does 
Not Participate in Good Faith in Conciliation   
Judicial review of conciliation efforts is necessary to encourage 
voluntary compliance through out-of-court negotiations and settlements.  It 
is imperative that both the employer and the Commission engage in good 
faith efforts to conciliate to provide the voluntary compliance that Congress 
intended.  The use of a “failure to conciliate” affirmative defense should not 
provide the opportunity for employers to get off the hook for potential 
discriminatory actions.  Rather, the defense should provide a remedy that 
encourages compliance with conciliation procedures for both the 
Commission and the employer.  The NLRA’s approach to collective 
bargaining, through which the NLRB may review collective bargaining 
procedures to determine whether good faith was used, should provide a 
model for Congress to establish an appropriate remedy.145   
The NLRB’s ability to review collective bargaining procedures is 
similar to judicial review of conciliation because it examines whether good 
faith was used.146  It is crucial that the NLRB is statutorily authorized to 
impose sanctions on both employers and unions who do not engage in good 
faith collective bargaining procedures, as it does not allow for either party to 
get off the hook when the other does not engage in good faith conciliation.  
The statutory authorization provides guidance to the NLRB regarding what 
sanctions are allowed as well as encouragement to unions and employers to 
engage in good faith collective bargaining.  Knowing that the actions are 
reviewable and having notice of possible sanctions makes collective 
bargaining procedures meaningful because the parties will want to 
voluntarily comply without the NLRB’s involvement, instead of wasting 
                                                                                                                           
144. EEOC v. Mach Mining, L.L.C., 738 F.3d 171, 183 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2872 
(2014). 
145. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2013).  See also Employer/Union Rights and Obligations, NLRB, 
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time, money, and resources.  Furthermore, the parties cannot avoid their 
problem by arguing that the other party did not engage in the statutory good 
faith requirement because the court will just require them to return to the 
bargaining table.     
Congress should amend the statute to provide a remedy similar to that 
given to the NLRB.  Without a prescribed remedy, judicial review of 
conciliation seems almost meaningless.  It is clear that Congress did not 
intend for employers to get off the hook for discriminatory practices.  Instead, 
by requiring the Commission to attempt conciliation prior to bringing a claim 
against an employer, Congress meant for employers to voluntarily comply 
with Title VII by eradicating any discriminatory practices.  Reaching this 
goal requires the participation of both the employer and the Commission, 
which is why an approach similar to the NLRB’s is necessary.  If the court 
can review and sanction both the employer and the Commission, each party 
will be compelled to engage in good faith in the conciliation process from 
the beginning.  Judicial review is necessary, but without an enforcement 
mechanism it becomes a way to prolong litigation without reaching voluntary 
compliance.  Therefore, Congress should amend § 2000e-5 of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 to provide a remedy when the 
Commission engages in conciliation with an employer, and either party is 
found to have failed their duty to engage in good faith conciliation.    
The remedy should be placed in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) because, among 
other things, this section contains the preconditions and the procedure for the 
Commission to file suit.  Using the NLRA’s language for guidance,147 the 
statute could provide: 
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken, a court shall be of the 
opinion that any party named in the complaint has failed to engage in a good 
faith attempt at conciliation, then the Court shall state its findings of fact 
and shall issue an order for the conciliation process to be resumed and any 
other action as will effectuate the policies of this Act. 
It also makes sense for Congress to add a possible remedy similar to the 
NLRB’s additional sanction of reimbursing the charging party for 
negotiating expenses.148 The statute could provide “Where a party 
                                                                                                                           
147. See id. § 160(c) (“If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion 
that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor 
practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such 
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as effectuate the policies of this Act . . . .”). 
148. See Unbelievable, Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 857, 859 (1995) (“[Where] a respondent's substantial unfair 
labor practices have infected the core of a bargaining process to such an extent that their effects 
cannot be eliminated by the application of traditional remedies, an order requiring the respondent 
to reimburse the charging party for negotiation expenses is warranted . . . .”). 
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participates in bad faith in the conciliation process to such an extent that the 
effects cannot be eliminated by the application of traditional remedies, an 
order requiring the respondent to reimburse the charging party for 
conciliation expenses, including attorney’s fees, is warranted.”  
This is an appropriate action because it clearly states the repercussions 
of not participating in good faith in conciliation procedures.  It would work 
well because both the Commission and an employer could pursue this remedy 
if either feels the other party is not sincerely participating in the process.  If 
the Commission acts in haste and does not participate in good faith in the 
conciliation process, the employer is not off the hook.  Rather, the 
conciliation process will be reopened and revisited.  Furthermore, the 
additional sanction of having to pay the other party’s conciliation expenses 
and attorney’s fees for wasting time and resources emphasizes the 
importance of conciliation.  These remedies encourage all parties to 
participate fully in conciliation procedures to reach voluntary compliance 
because, if a court finds the party did not participate in good faith, the 
procedures will be reopened.   
Although voluntary compliance with Title VII is the goal, it will not 
always be possible.  The Commission may file suit when an employer 
maintains it has not engaged in the alleged discriminatory practice.  At this 
point, a court’s judgment will be necessary to determine the rights and 
responsibilities of the parties.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Both the Commission and employers have engaged in bad faith 
conciliation procedures in the past.  However, employers have used the 
Commission’s mistakes to their advantage to avoid litigation.  It is imperative 
that the failure to conciliate continues as an affirmative defense to encourage 
parties to engage in good faith conciliation procedures and ensure Congress’ 
goal of encouraging out of court negotiations and settlements is met.  This 
defense should be available to both parties when either believes the other 
party has not engaged in good faith endeavors at conciliation.  A minimal 
review of conciliation efforts is the proper standard because it provides the 
Commission with deference to determine the appropriate conciliation 
agreement in the circumstances, but also provides an incentive for the parties 
to conciliate properly the first time.   
Furthermore, Congress should amend 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) to provide 
that a party who has engaged in bad faith conciliation may have to pay the 
other party’s attorney’s fees or negotiation costs.  Although Congress granted 
the Commission with the power to bring suit against an employer it believes 
has engaged in unlawful discrimination, the Commission must follow the 
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conciliation procedures in place. A minimal review of conciliation 
procedures and a statutory amendment are the best way to ensure the 
statutory requirements are meaningfully followed. 

